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Abstract: We investigate whether workers adjust hours worked in response to windfall gains 
using data from the European Household Panel. The results suggest that unexpected variation 
in  income  has  a  negative  (although  small)  effect  on  working  hours.  In  particular,  after 
receiving an unanticipated windfall gain, individuals are more likely to drop out of the labour 
force  and  the  effects  become  larger  as  the  size  of  windfall  increases.  Furthermore,  the 
empirical  findings  show  that  the  impact  of  windfall  gains  on  labour  supply:  (i)  is  more 
important for young and old individuals, (ii) is mostly negative for married individuals with 
young children, (iii) but can be positive for single individuals at the age of around 40 years. 
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1. Introduction 
What  is  the  effect  of  windfall  gains  on  economic  behaviour?  A  popular  belief 
presumes that the majority of people would quit work if they won a lottery. But do windfall 
gains have an impact on individuals‟ working hours? According to the life-cycle model, a 
relaxation or tightening of the consumer‟s intertemporal budget constraint can lead both to 
changes  in  consumption  and  to  changes  in  labour  supply.  Windfall  gains  represent  an 
unanticipated increase in non-earned income and by reducing an agent‟s marginal utility of 
wealth they therefore reduce her incentive to work. 
In this paper, we analyze the linkages between windfall gains and working hours using 
data from the European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. We show 
that an unanticipated rise in wealth reduces working hours in accordance with the life-cycle 
model, although the effect is, in general, small. The impact of windfall gains is stronger at the 
external margin, that is, individuals adjust their labour supply primarily by dropping out of the 
labour force, rather than by reducing their work hours conditional on working. 
We also look whether “size matters” with respect to the effects of windfall gains on 
working hours. We assess how households respond to small, medium or large windfall gains. 
We find that the effects become stronger as the size of windfall increases. In particular, men 
receiving a windfall of 50,000 EUR or more, on average reduce labour supply by 1.3 hours 
per week, which is equivalent to a 3.4% reduction in working hours. 
Finally, analysing the effects of windfall gains along various personal characteristics, 
we find that: (i) at younger and older ages, the effect of windfall gains on labour supply is the 
most negative; (ii) for married people and people with young children, the windfall gain leads 
to a stronger decrease in working hours and (iii) for single individuals at the age of around 40, 
the effect can be positive. A potential explanation for the latter empirical finding is in the 
effect of windfall gains on reducing liquidity constraints in capital markets. By doing so, 
windfall gains may encourage people to set up their own business, become self-employed and 
increase their working hours. 
This paper contributes to the literature in following ways. This is the first paper that 
analyses effects of windfall gains on working hours using data for a set of European countries. 
Furthermore, because we include 15 countries in our analysis, the sample of people for which 
we observe windfall gains is large, offering a further empirical advantage to our approach. 
With the panel data set, we observe a rich set of personal characteristics of individuals. This 
gives us an opportunity to better understand the ways that participation and working-hours 
decisions differ between individuals. 3 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature  on  the  effects  of  unexpected  variation  in  income.  Section  3  describes  the  data. 
Section 4 presents the theoretical and the econometric approach and Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A brief review of the literature 
The launch of the pan-European lottery, Euromillions, in 2004 induced many people to 
fantasize about what they would do if they actually won.  Notable wins include prizes of 
around 180 Million EUR which, therefore, reveals the extraordinary importance that a lottery 
may play in people‟s life and behaviour.  
A vast literature has explored the reaction of consumption and savings to exogenous 
changes in income. An early example is Bodkin (1959), who used an unexpected National 
Service Life Insurance dividend paid to veterans of the World War II in 1950. Similarly, 
Brickman et al. (1978) focused on how the income effect affects consumption. More recent 
examples  include  Imbens  et  al.  (2001),  who  look  at  the  differences  among  major-prize 
winners of the Megabucks Lottery in Massachusetts between 1984 and 1988, and Kuhn et al. 
(2008), who analyze the differences in winnings in the Dutch postcode lottery.
1 
Unexpected variation in income may also affect the level of happiness of individuals.
2 
Whereas some surveys suggest that money indeed makes people happy (Gardner and Oswald, 
2001), others find  only  a weak link between unexpected wealth variation and happiness 
(Myers, 1992; Argyle, 2001; Nettle, 2005; Layard, 2005).
3 
Another dimension of the effects of exogenous changes in income refers to fiscal 
policy  and,  in  particular,  the  effectiveness  of  temporary  fiscal  measures.
4  In  fact, 
understanding the effect of unearned income on labour supply is also of great importance for 
policy makers, as it is at least part of what is needed to evaluate such programs ( Joshi et al., 
1996;  Kuhn  et al., 2008). For instance,  Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) find that strict 
employment  protection  legislation  characterizes  well  the dynamics  of  unemployment  in 
France, while fixed-term contracts contribute significantly to the dynamics of unemployment 
in Spain. Manning (2009) shows that changes in the welfare support for the unemployed can 
impact on the labour market, by reducing their search activity.  
                                                 
1  Some  recent  studies  have  also  used  exogenous  variation  to  analyze  neighbourhood  and  peer  effects  on 
individuals (Sacerdote, 2001; Katz et al., 2001; Kling et al., 2005; Ludwig et al., 2001; Kuhn et al., 2008). 
2 For discussions of this question, see, for example, Easterlin (1974) and Martin (1995). 
3 Lindahl (2005) shows that higher income from a monetary lottery prize generates good health. 
4  For a revision of the  major developments in labour market theory and their policy implications, see, for 
instance, Manning (1995). 4 
 
In addition to the potential effects of income shocks on consumption and savings or on 
the level of happiness, a popular belief presumes that the majority of people would quit work 
if they won a lottery. But do individuals who win continue to work, and if so, why? While the 
literature on the empirical and theoretical inter-temporal substitution effects in labour supply 
is well established (Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980; Altonji, 1986), the research on the effects 
of  capital  gains  is  still  somewhat  insipient  (Henley,  2004),  despite  the  fact  that  lottery 
winnings are a source of exogenous variation in income (Altonji, 1986).  
In the US, Kaplan (1988) show that the level of education and the type of profession 
can help explain the percentages of winners who choose to continue to work.
5 Holtz-Eakin et 
al. (1993) and Imbens et al. (2001) find that windfall gains lead to a  reduction in working 
hours or even a withdrawal from the labour  force. In contrast, Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) 
suggest at most a small (although significant) effect for married women and men. Hirschfeld 
and Field (2000) use the proposition of work centrality, that is, the degree of importance that 
working has in one's life at any given time to explain why lotteries may have a limited impact. 
In Europe, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Taylor (2001), using UK data, and Lindh 
and Ohlsson (1996), based on evidence for Sweden, report a positive effect of windfall gains 
(inheritance and lottery wins) on the probability of entering self-employment. Henley (2004) 
analyzes the impact of both windfall financial gains and house price shocks on hours worked, 
and suggests that there are significant substitution effects, in particular, in response to house 
price shocks. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data 
The data is obtained from the European Community Household Panel Longitudinal 
Users' Database (ECHP henceforth). This is a large panel data set that contains household-
level and person-level information over time, covering eight survey years from 1994 to 2001.
6 
The  data  includes  15  EU  countries:  Germany,  Denmark,  The  Netherlands,  Belgium, 
Luxembourg,  France,  United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  Italy,  Greece,  Spain,  Portugal,  Austria, 
                                                 
5 Note that the education level can also be a proxy for a worker‟s skill. In this context, Portela (2001) proposes 
an index of skill that takes into account different dimensions, namely, schooling, labor market experience and 
unobservable ability. 
6 Azmat et al. (2006) also use the European Community Household Panel Survey, but in the context of analyzing 
the large gender gap in unemployment rates. Notably, the authors show that interactions between the differences 
in human capital accumulation by gender and labor market institutions play a major role. In a similar context, 
Joshi et al. (2007) argue that women‟s education and experience rather than a movement towards equal treatment 
play a special role in gender pay differences. Mumford and Smith (2007, 2009) find that the gender earnings gap 
can also be largely explained by the workplace in which the employee works. 5 
 
Finland and Sweden. It is an unbalanced panel with a maximum length of 8 years for each 
individual. 
In what follows, the analysis is done at the individual level, rather than at the level of 
households, with age restricted to 25-60 years. This age band is chosen to avoid complications 
that  arise  due  to  education  and  retirement  choices.  The  data  on  incomes  and  wages  are 
converted using PPP in order to allow for comparisons across countries and over time.  
The question of interest relates to the effects of unanticipated windfall gains on labour 
supply. Working hours are described by the ECHP variable PE005: Total number of hours 
working per week (in main + additional jobs). In the data, this variable is only available for 
employed workers. However, we set hours worked to zero for all unemployed individuals and 
those out of the labour force. 
The  variable  that  measures  windfall  gains  is  the  ECHP  variable  HF017:  Inherit, 
receive gift or lottery winnings worth 2000 EURO or more. It is the response to a following 
survey question: “During (… year prior to the survey …), did anyone in the household inherit 
any property or capital, or receive a gift or lottery winnings, worth 2000 EURO or more?”. 
Observations for which the information on the windfall receipt is missing are discarded. 
One major drawback of this variable is that it does not provide information about the 
exact amount of the windfall gain. However, it can be complemented by the variable HF018: 
Amount of the inheritance, gift or lottery winnings. This variable offers three brackets for the 
windfall gains: less than 10,000 EURO, more than 10,000 EURO but less than 50,000 EURO 
and  50,000  EURO  or  more.  We  label  the  three  brackets  for  windfall  gains  as  “small”, 
“medium” and “large”, respectively. 
These two variables hence give information on the size of windfall gains received by 
individuals.  Nevertheless,  given  that  they  are  reported  in  categorical  terms,  one  cannot 
convert them into PPP terms. As a result, they are not perfectly comparable across countries 
and over time. Another weakness is that both variables are reported at the household level. 
Consequently, there is no way to identify which household member was the actual recipient of 
the windfall gain.
7 
                                                 
7 It should be noted, however, that an indicator for a windfall gain is, to some degree, a personal characteristic. 
For example, in cases where individuals change households (i.e. get married) and they receive windfall gains 
only after they have moved to a new household, they are recorded as recipients of windfall gains together with 
their partner. Naturally, individuals from the initial household have not received any windfall gains. Should the 
individual move households again with a new partner, for example, then he would still be recorded as a recipient 
of windfall gains, but his new partner would not. 6 
 
It is important to emphasise that the variable measuring windfall gains is recorded for 
the “year prior to the survey”.
8 Notwithstanding this, we did not decide to adjust the timing of 
the variable. First, a substantial fraction of the data (that is, 19% of person-year observations) 
would be lost  by  lagging  the windfall gains  variable  by  one period.  Second,  leaving the 
variable as it is, we can be sure that at the time of  the interview in the time period t, an 
individual knows  whether she has  received windfall  gains or not.  On the contrary,  if we 
lagged windfall gains variable by one period, to t-1, we would not know for sure whether at 
the time of the interview at t-1 the individual had already received the windfall gains or not.
9 
Furthermore, in practice individuals take a bit of time before  they react to new economic 
information. Therefore, it seems more appropriate not to lag the windfall gains variable back 
by one period. 
In Table 1, we report the number of individuals in the sample and the number of times 
they received windfall gains. Only those individuals who were observed at least twice are 
included. To ease discussion, we label people that have received windfall gains as “winners” 
and the rest as “non-winners”. There are 100,289 individuals in the sample, and most of them 
(88.4%) never received any inheritance, gift or lottery winnings of more than 2000 EUR. In 
addition, 8,824 individuals (or a fraction of 8.8%) received windfall gains only once, and 
about 2% of individuals received windfall gains twice. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 1 HERE. ] 
 
For  the  purpose  of  the  analysis,  the  most  important  group  is  the  one  with  8,824 
individuals who received windfall gains only once, as in the regression analysis it is not 
straightforward to deal with individuals who received windfall gains more than once. Most of 
the empirical analysis will therefore be based on that group. Compared to similar research 
done by other authors, this is quite a large sample and represents one of the advantages of 
using the ECHP dataset.
10  
                                                 
8 Similarly, income variables are also recorded for “year prior to the survey”. On the other hand, net monthly 
wage and other variables are recorded for “the time of the interview”. 
9 How much information the individual possesses at the time of the interview of course depends on the relative 
timings of windfall gains and survey interview, but on average there is a 50% chance that the individual had 
already received the windfall gains. 
10 For instance, Imbens et al.  (2001) have about 237 winners,  Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) have 439 heirs in 
their sample, Holtz-Eakin (1993) have 2,700 married couples and 1632 individuals in their sample, and Henley 
(2004) has around 5,400 men and women included. 7 
 
In Table 2, we report the number of individuals by size of windfall gains received. 
There are 4,172 (48.8%) observed individuals with small windfall gains, 3,353 (39.2%) with 
medium windfall gains, and 1,023 (12.0%) individuals with large windfall gains. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 2 HERE. ] 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
In this sub-section, we analyse differences in personal characteristics between winners 
and non-winners prior to the receipt of windfall gains, and differences among winners of 
windfall gains of different sizes (i.e. small versus large winners). We also compare the means 
of variables before and after the receipt of windfall gains.  
Table  3  reports  the  means  and  number  of  observations  for  selected  variables, 
comparing winners, (columns (1) and (2)) and non-winners (columns (3) and (4)). Column (5) 
reports the p-value of the test for differences in means between winners and non-winners. The 
reported  statistics  refer  to  one  year  before  the  receipt  of  windfall,  which,  on  average, 
corresponds to a third year in the sample for winners. Therefore, for non-winners we report 
the means of the variables in the third year in the sample.  
Among the 18 variables reported, only three (the number of children in the household, 
the percentage of women and the percentage of those who are married) have differences that 
are not statistically significant.
11 Otherwise, winners tend to be older and they live in slightly 
smaller households, but for  these  two  variable differences are small.   For the rest of the 
variables, the differences are large and important.  
Winners are more educated; the share of individuals with post secondary education is 
29% for winners and 18% for non-winners; winners are 7 percentage points more likely to be 
employed than non-winners. According to income variables, winners have higher incomes 
and wages even before windfall gains. By all measures of income (total income, income from 
working and non-work income), winners are better off than non-winners: the personal total 
income of winners is about 29% higher and hourly wage
12 is 13% higher. Higher income is 
                                                 
11  Interestingly,  Joshi  et  al.  (1996)  show  that  the  presence  of  children  reduces  full-time  emplyment  among 
women. Similarly, Joshi (1998) highlights the impact of child-rearing on women‟s time use.  
12 Hourly wage is a measure of offered wages in the labour market. Reported data is in purchasing power parity 
units in order to be comparable across countries. Hourly wage is calculated from net monthly wage given in the 
data, divided by weekly working hours times 4.33 to correct for the average n umber of weeks in one month. All 
hourly wages lower than 1 euro or higher than 100 euros are put to missing. Wages of people who do not work 
or wages otherwise missing are then imputed. For those individuals of which wage information is available in 
some periods but not in others, the average wage of the individual is imputed in other periods. Other wages are 8 
 
partly a consequence of the fact that winners, on average, work more hours per week and they 
are more likely to be employed. They are also more educated and thus have higher hourly 
wage. However, another potential reason for the difference in incomes lays also in the fact 
that our measure of windfall gains includes gifts and inheritances. It can then be the case that 
people from better family backgrounds are more likely to receive (large) gifts or inheritances, 
which  is  reflected  in  our  data.  Family  background  is  of  course  a  fixed  effect  and  will 
eventually  drop  out  of  the  analysis  when  data  will  be  analysed  using  our  econometric 
methodology. 
The observed differences between winners and non-winners from Table 3 could of 
course reflect simply differences across countries. If there was a country with above average 
number of winners, and also with above average incomes, this would make winners, in a 
spurious fashion, appear to have higher incomes in the full sample. Data show that in most 
countries, between 87% and 96% of the sample is comprised of non-winners. However, four 
countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Belgium) have a lower percentage of non-
winners, but when we checked differences in means after excluding these four countries, the 
magnitudes  and  conclusions  were  similar.  Therefore,  we  conclude  that  the  differences 
reported in Table 3 reflect genuine differences between winners and non-winners. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 3 HERE. ] 
 
In Table 4, we turn to comparisons of personal characteristics among winners of small, 
medium and large windfall gains. We report means and number of observations one period 
prior  to  the  receipt  of  windfall.  Columns  (7)  –  (9)  report  p-values  from  testing  the  null 
hypothesis of no differences in means between groups.  
No statistically significant differences between winners of windfall gains of different 
sizes  are  found  for  household  size,  number  of  adults,  number  of  children  in  household, 
percentage of females, marital status, and employment status. On the other hand, there are 
statistically significant differences in age and education: the group with small windfall gains 
is significantly younger than the other two groups (i.e. 41.4 years compared to 42.5 and 42.8 
years for medium and large windfall gains groups, respectively); the group of large winners is 
also more educated (37% of large winners have education beyond the secondary level, while 
only 27% of small winners and 28% of medium winners have education of such level). 
                                                                                                                                                         
imputed using a regression equation separately for men and women using age, age squared, married dummy, two 
education dummies and wave and country dummies as regressors. 9 
 
There are also large and highly significant differences in incomes between the three 
groups; the larger the windfall gains, the higher the income. Such differences in incomes and 
education can again be explained with family characteristics. If people with higher education 
and  household  incomes  tend  to  be  from  families  of  better  background,  then  this  may  be 
reflected in higher inheritances or gifts. However, this will be controlled for by fixed effects 
in our estimation. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 4 HERE. ] 
 
Finally, in Table 5, we compare the means of personal characteristics before and after 
the receipt of windfall gains. “Before” stands for one period prior to windfall and “after” 
stands for one period after the windfall. Intuitively, we would expect non-work income to 
increase from the period before to the period after the receipt of windfall gains. However, this 
is not necessarily the case, because, strictly speaking, windfall gains bring a one-off increase 
in non-work income that lasts only for one period. Nevertheless, it is possible that individuals 
save or invest part of their unanticipated gains and start earning interest, which may increase 
their  non-work  income  also  in  subsequent  periods.  According  to  the  life-cycle  theory  of 
labour supply, the receipt of an unexpected windfall should also reduce working hours and 
employment of the winners. 
Consider first the top panel of Table 5, where differences for the whole sample are 
reported. Only two variables are (marginally) significantly different between the two periods: 
total  household  income  is  slightly  higher  after  the  receipt  of  windfall  gains  at  a  10% 
significance level and household non-work income is higher at a 6% significance level and 
personal hourly wage is higher at 7% significance. Weekly hours worked show no difference 
in the two periods. Looking at the group with small windfall gains, changes in none of the 
variables are statistically significant from one period to another, except for the hourly wage, 
which tends to be higher after the receipt of windfall gains. The percentage of employed 
people  and  weekly  working  hours  both  slightly  decrease,  but  the  differences  are  not 
significantly different from zero. In the case of individuals who received medium windfall 
gains, there is a statistically significant rise in the household income from working, in the 
unearned household income and in the personal unearned income. Interestingly, the share of 
employed people and weekly working hours show a slight increase, although the differences 
are not significant. Finally, for the group with large windfall gains, household total income (at 
a 1% significance level), household income from working (at a 9% significance level) and 10 
 
personal  total  income  (at  a  9%  significance  level)  all  rise  from  one  period  to  another. 
Employment  and working hours slightly decrease, but  the differences  are not  statistically 
significant. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 5 HERE. ] 
 
3.3 Non-work income and working hours over time 
In this sub-section, we show the evolution of unearned income and working hours over 
time. From the previous analysis, windfall gains do not seem to have strong effects on income 
or on labour supply, since differences over time, before and after the windfall gains,  are 
mostly not statistically significant. Hence, one could ask whether the windfall gains variable 
is a correct measure. For this reason, Figure 1 depicts the average (household and personal) 
non-work income over time. The time period “0” refers to a time of windfall gains receipt. 
Since the maximum number of periods for an individual in the sample is eight, the graph is 
plotted only for five years prior and five years after the receipt of windfall gains. Moving 
further away from the point of receipt would make the sample size become very small. From 
Figure 1, it can be seen that the variable windfall gains is meaningful and informative. Indeed 
there is a positive blip in both household and personal non-work income at the time of receipt. 
After that, non-work income returns to its upward trend. 
 
[ PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE. ] 
 
Figure  2  displays  household  income  over  time  by  size  of  windfall  gains.  Due  to 
limitations in the sample size, we put the large windfall gains and the medium windfall gains 
groups into a single category. Non-work household income of the medium/large group is, in 
general,  higher  than  for  the  small  group.  The  discrete  jump  in  income  in  the  period  the 
windfall gains are received is still visible for both groups, and, as expected, is larger for the 
group that receives medium/large gains. 
 
[ PLACE FIGURE 2 HERE. ] 
 
Next,  we turn to the evolution  of weekly  working hours (Figure  3  and  Figure  4). 
Figure 3 shows that the positive trend in average weekly working hours is reversed after the 
receipt of windfall gains. Similar information is conveyed by Figure 4, where we split the 11 
 
sample between those who receive small windfall gains and those who receive either medium 
or large windfall gains. Whereas the evolution of working hours for the small group seems to 
be more or less unchanged, the downward trend after windfall gains for medium/large group 
is more apparent. This is consistent with the hypothesis that, after receiving windfall gains, 
individuals adjust their labour supply downwards. Of course, this is a very crude method of 
relating working hours to windfall gains and in the analysis that follows we will proceed with 
the regression analysis. 
 
[ PLACE FIGURE 3 HERE. ] 
 
[ PLACE FIGURE 4 HERE. ] 
 
4. Theory and econometric approach 
4.1 The impact of windfalls on working hours: A theoretical illustration 
Consider a representative consumer who chooses consumption, Ct, and leisure hours, 
Lt, in order to maximize lifetime utility 
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where U represents the utility function in time period t that is separable in consumption and 
leisure, Nt denotes hours worked equal to L
* (a fixed time endowment) minus Lt, A0 refers to 







) 1 ( 1 , where r is the real 
rate of interest, and   is the rate of time preference. 
Following MaCurdy (1981), we assume that U has the following form for individual i 
at time t 
 
2 1
2 1 ) , (
    it it it it it it i N C L C U               (3) 12 
 
 
where  1   and  2   are „taste-shifters‟ which depend on consumer i‟s preferences at t, 0 <  1   < 
1 and  2   > 1.  
If we consider an interior optimum (that is, for Nit > 0), the logarithm of the labour 
supply function for a given marginal utility of wealth can be expressed as  
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where  denotes the marginal utility of wealth. 
We  assume  that  „tastes‟  for  work  are  randomly  distributed  according  to  the 
relationship 
*
2 log it i it it u X        where Xit denotes the set of observable determinants of 
consumer‟s  tastes,  i    represents  the  unobserved  permanent  component  of  consumer‟s 
characteristics and 
*
it u  a time-varying random component with zero mean. 
Assuming a constant real interest rate, replacing the distribution for „tastes for work‟ 
in equation (4) and using approximation x x   ) 1 log( ,  we  can  simplify  the labour  supply 
function as 
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Following  Altonji  (1986)  and  Joulfaian  and  Wilhelm  (1994),  we  assume  that  the 
marginal utility of wealth evolves as 
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where  it    represents  the  forecast  error  of  the  marginal  utility  for  next  period  and a  is  a 
parameter determined by the discount factor, the interest rates, and the distribution of the 
forecast error. We approximate  1  it   by  
 
i i t i it G E Z          )) ( log( log 1 1                                           (7) 
 13 
 
where  Z  represents  the  family  background  characteristics  and  the  effect  of  the  expected 
lifetime wage profile on the marginal utility, Et-1[Gi] denotes the expected present value of the 
capital gain (loss), including for example potential inheritance and other windfall gains, and 
i    captures  any  individual  unobserved  time  invariant  heterogeneity  in  marginal  utility  of 
wealth.  Combining  equations  (6)  and  (7)  and  plugging  into  equation  (5),  we  obtain  the 
following labour supply representation: 
 
. log
) ( ) log ( )) ( log( ) ( log 2 1
it it it it
i t i i i it
u X W
t r a G E Z N
   
         
  
        
        (8) 
 
It is clear from the first and the second term on the RHS of (8) that that labour supply 
response should be estimated using fixed effects estimation. Thus one eliminates the need to 
explicitly control for family background and also removes any potential biases due to i  . 
When the capital gain is fully unanticipated (that is, Et-1[Gi]=0), capital gains affect 
labour supply only via the forecast error,  it  . Assuming that the forecast error is a proportion 
  of the actual capital gain, that is,  it it G    , where   < 0, then labour supply response will 
be  , which is negative. 
However, when the capital gain is fully anticipated (that is,  i i t G G E   ) ( 1  and  0  it  ),  
then capital gains will exert their effects on labour supply by  . Given that marginal utility 
would have lowered before the time period in question, there would be no further adjustment 
at the time of inheritance. Therefore, the unanticipated windfall gains reduce the marginal 
utility of wealth, and thus reduce labour supply. 
 
4.2 The impact of windfalls on working hours: the econometric specification 
Despite the large literature concerned with estimating the impact of unearned income 
on labour supply, the use of an exogenous measure of income variation is not consensual. As 
a result, different approaches have been considered, namely: (i) the capital income or spousal-
labour  earnings  as  variables  measuring  unearned  income  (Imbens  et  al.,  2001);  (ii) 
experimental data with exogenous components of unearned income (Rees, 1974; Pencavel, 
1986); and (iii) natural experiments in which large amounts of money were allocated using 
distribution rules that were independent of preferences and other determinants of economic 
behaviour (Bodkin, 1959; Kreinin, 1961; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993).   14 
 
We  start  by  looking  at  whether  the  windfall  gain  affects  the  probability  of  being 
employed, and estimate the following linear probability model 
 
   c c = 1) Prob(E 3 2 1 0i 0 it it it it it X c W c Windfall c                                     (9) 
 
for i = 1, …, N, t = 1, …, T, where Eit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
individual i is employed or 0 otherwise, Windfallit is our variable of interest and takes the 
value of 1 if the household has received a windfall gain or 0 otherwise, Wit denotes the hourly 
wage, Xit represents a set of controls for age, civil status and family characteristics,  0i c  is 
individual fixed effect and    it  is an i.i.d. error term. 
In order to assess the effect of unexpected capital gains on working hours, we estimate 
the empirical counter-part of Equation (8) as described by 
 
   c c = H 3 2 1 0i 0 it it it it it X c W c Windfall c                                   (10)  
 
for i = 1, …, N, t = 1, …, T, where Hit stands for weekly working hours of household i in year 
t. 
Taking into account that the impact of windfalls on labour supply differs for different 
amounts of unanticipated gains, we also disaggregate the Windfall dummy into three different 
categories: (i) Small Windfall, in the case of capital gains between 2,000 and 10,000 EUR; (ii) 
Medium Windfall, for capital gains between 10,000 and 50,000 EUR; and (iii) Large Windfall, 
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for i = 1, …, N, t = 1, …, T. 
Finally, we look at whether the effect of the windfall varies with different personal 
characteristics. Therefore, we interact the regressors with the Windfall dummy and estimate 
the following model: 
 
  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( c c = H 3 2 1 0i 0 it it it it it it it Windfall X c Windfall W c Windfall c              (12)  15 
 
 
for i = 1, …, N,  t = 1, …, T. 
The estimation of the above models is complicated by the potential endogeneity of the 
wage term on the right-hand side.
13 Altonji (1986) emphasizes that current labour supply 
depends on all past and expected future wage rates and that it is important to control for 
permanent differences in wages across individuals.  
Consequently, we assess the robustness of the results using both the fixed effects (FE) 
estimator and the fixed effects instrumental variable (FEIV) estimator. In the IV regressions, 
we follow Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) and Henley (2004) and instrument log hourly wages 
using conventional earnings-function control variables, namely, two dummies for education, 
interactions between education dummies and  a  quadratic in age, as well as   country-year 
dummies. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 The effects of windfall gains on working hours 
In  this  and  subsequent  sub-sections,  we  analyse  the  effect  of  windfall  gains  on 
working hours. According to the empirical specification of the theoretical model presented 
above, we use the fixed effects estimation, thus controlling for family background and other 
time-invariant personal characteristics. Windfall gains are measured using a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 in the period of windfall receipt and after, and 0 in periods prior to 
windfall  gains.  This  is  in  line  with  the  life-cycle  model  of  labour  supply  where  after  an 
unanticipated shock in personal wealth, an individual adjusts her whole labour-supply profile. 
In all specifications we include the following set of regressors: the dummy variable for 
the windfall gain, age, age squared, a dummy for married status and two dummy variables 
indicating whether there are any children aged 0-6 or 7-15 in the household. We focus on 
three main specifications, each of them being estimated for the full sample (Table 6), and then 
separately for men (Table 7) and for women (Table 8). 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 6 HERE. ] 
 
The  first  specification  (column  (1))  analyses  the  effects  of  windfall  gains  on  the 
probability of being employed. According to the theory, after receiving unanticipated windfall 
                                                 
13 Pencavel (1986) also highlights the endogeneity of nonwage income. In the context of our framework we 
consider windfall gains as unanticipated and exogenous. 16 
 
gains, individuals are more likely to drop out of the labour force and use windfall gains to 
enjoy  more  leisure.  Such  behaviour  is  reported  in  Holtz-Eakin  et  al.  (1993),  who  find  a 
negative  effect  of  unanticipated  inheritances  on  participation  in  the  labour  market.  As  a 
dependent  variable  we  use  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  or  not  an  individual  is 
employed.
14 Normally, probit specification would be used to analyse this ; however, due to 
inconsistency of probit regression in settings with fixed effects, we use a li near probability 
model instead.
15 
The second specification (column (2)) uses working hours per week as a dependent 
variable. In this case we include all  individuals who ever received windfall gains no matter 
whether they participate in the labour force in any particular period or not. That is, working 
hours can take any positive value, but they can also be zero.  The second specification thus 
covers both external and internal margins of adjustment of labour supply  to windfall gains
16. 
In addition to the standard controls on the right hand side, this specification  also includes a 
measure of hourly wage. As the hourly wage is computed from monthly wages and weekly 
working  hours,  it  is  endogenous.  Consequently,  we  also  report  the  results  from  an 
instrumental variables estimation (column (3)). Here we overcome the endogeneity problem 
by using two dummies for education, interactions of education dummies with quartic in age , 
as well as country-year dummies as instruments for hourly wage. 
Finally, in the third specification (column (4)), we express working hours and wages in 
logs. As a consequence, only person -year observations with positive working hours  and 
positive wages are included. This specification is closest to the theoretical approach based on 
the interior solution of the life-cycle optimisation problem derived in  section 4.1. From an 
econometric perspective, however, one should note that a potential problem in this  context 
stems from the fact that when receiving windfall gains individuals may decide to reduce their 
working effort either by reducing working hours or by dropping out of the labour force, which 
can generate a selection bias problem. We present the results both from the fixed effect setting 
(column (4)) and the instrumental variable estimation with fixed effects (column (5)). 
Table 6 summarizes the findings for the effects of windfall gains on working hours 
using the whole sample. The empirical evidence is not supportive of theoretical prediction of 
the life-cycle model that an unanticipated rise in wealth reduces an individual‟s working hours 
                                                 
14 In our sample, about 25% of people change their employment status at least once. 
15 In all cases in the paper where we estimated the linear probability model we also checked the results using 
logit specification with fixed effects. Results were very similar with the same conclusions. 
16 Due to the number of zeroes on the left hand  side, we estimated this specification also using the Tobit with 
fixed effects estimator from Honore (1992). The results were again very similar and conclusions would be the 
same. 17 
 
via a reduction in the marginal utility of wealth, in particular, the coefficients of the windfall 
gains dummy are not statistically significant. On the other hand, most coefficients of the other 
control variables have the expected signs and magnitudes and are statistically significant: (i) 
age has a nonlinear, inverted “U” shaped effect on labour supply; (ii) being married tends to 
increase labour supply; and (iii) having children reduces it. Only hourly wage has a surprising 
negative  effect  on  working  hours,  which  is  reduced  after  using  instrumental  variables 
estimation, but it nevertheless remains negative and significant.
17 
Table 7 reports the results for the sample consisting of men. Again, the coefficients of 
the windfall gains dummy are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, they are negative , 
which is in accordance with the theoretical formulation of the life-cycle model. Other controls 
have coefficients of sensible signs and magnitudes and, in particular, one can see that being 
married increases men‟s labour supply. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 7 HERE. ] 
 
Table  8  shows  the  results  for  the  sample  consisting  of  women.  Again,  in  all  five 
specifications, the effects of windfall gains are not statistically significant and are close to 
zero.  These  findings  are  therefore  in  line  with  Imbens  et  al.  (2001),  who  show  that  the 
reaction  of  people  to  non-earned  income  does  not  differ  significantly  between  men  and 
women. Interestingly and in contrast with the results for men, there is an indication that being 
married reduces women‟s labour supply. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 8 HERE. ] 
 
So far we have found no supportive evidence that the receipt of unanticipated windfall 
gains has a significant and negative impact on labour supply. This finding however could 
either reflect that these effects are non-existent, or that they are very small and not  well 
captured in the data. In fact, other researchers have reported that unanticipated windfall gains 
(inheritances,  financial  wealth,  housing  prices)  have,  at  most,  a  small  impact  on  labour 
supply, which in many cases are only marginally statistically significant (Holtz-Eakin, 1993; 
                                                 
17 This is perhaps due to the income effect being stronger than the substitution effect, although empirically this 
remains an unresolved issue. All regressions reported in the chapter have also been run using net monthly wage 
instead. In this case, the coefficient on the wage variable was always positive in both the OLS and instrumental 
variables  specifications.  However,  the  coefficients  on  the  other  variables  and  the  conclusions  regarding  the 
effects of windfall gains were very similar to the results from the specifications which included the hourly wage. 18 
 
Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Henley, 2004). Another possible explanation for the small and 
not statistically significant results may lay in the fact that the windfall gains dummy used so 
far  does  not  contain  enough  information.  This  is  because  it  simply  indicates  whether  an 
individual  has  received  a  windfall  gain  or  not,  no  matter  what  the  size  of  the  gain  was. 
Therefore, in the next sub-section, we split the windfall dummy into three groups: small, 
medium and large. 
 
5.2 The effects of small, medium and large windfall gains 
We now introduce into the regression three dummies representing the size of windfall 
gains that individuals receive: small (less than 10,000 EURO), medium (more than 10,000 
EURO but less than 50,000 EURO) and large (50,000 EURO or more). The benchmark for 
comparison is the time before the windfall gains are received. For example, the small windfall 
gains dummy tells us by how much working hours decrease (or increase), on average, due to 
the windfall gain in comparison to the situation where the windfall gain has not yet been 
received. According to the theory, the higher the unanticipated windfall gain, the stronger the 
effect on the marginal utility of wealth and the more negative we expect the effect on labour 
supply to be. Therefore, we expect the effect of the large windfall gains dummy to be negative 
and largest in absolute value. 
We report the results separately for the whole sample, for men and for women, in 
Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11, respectively. 
Column  (1) of Table 9  suggests that windfall gains  have a  negative  effect  on  the 
probability  of  being  employed.  Despite  not  being  statistically  significant  for  small  and 
medium windfall gains, the coefficient associated with large windfall gains is negative and 
statistically significant. This lends some empirical support to the idea that after receiving large 
windfall gains, individuals are more likely to drop out of the labour force. As for the other 
specifications (columns (2) - (5)), the results are not statistically significant, although large 
windfall gains tend to have the most negative impact on labour supply. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 9 HERE. ] 
 
Table 10 displays the results for the sample of men. In all five specifications, not only 
is  the  coefficient  of  large  windfall  gains  the  most  negative,  but  it  is  also  statistically 
significant in all cases. Column (1) indicates that receiving large unanticipated windfall gains 
induces some men to leave the labour force. Similarly, in specifications with working hours 19 
 
on the left hand side (columns (2) – (5)) there is a statistically significant and negative effect 
of large windfall gains on working hours. 
Column (2) captures both external and internal margins of adjustment: on average, 
receiving an unanticipated windfall gain of 50,000 EUR or more reduces the labour supply of 
men by 1.3 hours per week. Since average working hours for men in the sample are equal to 
39.2 hours per week, this represents on average a 3.4% reduction in working hours. In column 
(4), where only the internal margin is considered, the evidence suggests that the large windfall 
gains reduce working hours by 2.1%. Since only the adjustment of working hours conditional 
on working is taken into account, the effect is plausibly smaller. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 10 HERE. ] 
 
The results for women in Table 11, on the other hand, are not supportive of the idea 
that windfall gains reduce labour supply. None of the coefficients on windfall gains dummies 
are statistically significant, and many of them are nonnegative. In light of the fact that women 
are usually considered as being less attached to the labour market than men, this result is 
surprising. One would indeed expect the effect of windfall gains to be stronger and more 
negative  for  women.  For  instance,  Henley  (2004)  finds  a  significant  adjustment  in  hours 
worked to  unanticipated financial  gains  for both men and women, but  the largest  impact 
occurs for women. In addition, the author shows that while men seem to make a (positive) 
adjustment in hours to housing losses but not a (negative) adjustment to gains, for women the 
reverse is true. On the other hand, Imbens et al. (2001) estimate the marginal propensity to 
earn out of unearned income and find that it does not differ significantly between men and 
women. Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) also show that the hours‟ reduction by married women 
is of the same order of magnitude as men's. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 11 HERE. ] 
 
A potential reason why the effects do not come through very strongly in the analysis 
above is due to heterogeneity in the effects of windfall gains. The effects of windfall gains 
may possibly depend on personal  characteristics  in  an important  way,  so  that the impact 
cancels  out  across different  individuals.  For  example, an old  worker  may  retire  from  the 
labour market after receiving the windfall gain, whereas a young employed worker may use it 
as  a  starting  capital  for  a  new  business,  become  self-employed  and  increase  his  labour 20 
 
supply.
18 In order to assess the potential heterogeneity in the effects of windfall gains, in the 
next sub-section we interact the windfall gains dummy with several personal characteristics. 
 
5.3 The effects of windfall gains and interactions 
In order to see whether the effects of unanticipated positive wealth shocks differ with 
respect  to  personal  characteristics,  we  interact  the  windfall  gains  dummy  with  the  other 
regressors.  As  discussed  above,  if  the  effects  of  windfall  gains  depend  on  personal 
characteristics and if, in addition, they cancel each other out across individuals, then this 
would  explain  why  in  the  previous  regressions  the  effects  were  small  and  often  not 
statistically significant. 
In Table 12 we report the results for the whole sample. Note that the coefficient in 
front of the windfall gain dummy alone simply represents the effect of windfall gains when all 
other controls  are set to zero.  In most cases, the coefficients of the interaction terms are 
statistically significant. Column (1) displays the results for the probability of being employed. 
Looking at the interactions, age has a “U“ shaped curve effect: at younger and older ages, the 
effect of windfall gains on participation is the most negative. This is in line with evidence 
reported by Holtz-Eakin (1993) and Imbens et al. (2001). 
Being  married  also  makes  the  negative  effect  of  windfall  gains  on  participation 
stronger. Thus, married people are more likely to reduce their labour supply. One possible 
explanation for this is that married people have less to worry about their income situation, as 
they have a partner who usually earns an income. Such behaviour can also be explained with a 
social multiplier (Glaeser et al., 2003). If people like to spend leisure in groups, then they are 
more likely to consume leisure when they have someone to spend the leisure with. 
In Columns (2) and (3) where total working hours are used as a dependent variable, 
results are similar: (i) there is an indication of a non-linear effect of age; (ii) being married 
makes the effect of windfall gains more negative; and (iii) similarly, having children of age 0-
6 leads to a larger decrease in working hours, indicating that parents of young children do not 
drop out of the labour force after receiving windfall gains, but they seek shorter working 
hours. Columns (4) and (5) show the results for the sample with positive hours worked. They 
confirm that being married and having small children makes the effect of windfall gains more 
negative. 
                                                 
18 Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) and Taylor (2001) find empirical evidence of such behaviour. The authors argue 
that windfall gains can contribute to the relaxation of the liquidity constraints in capital markets and they find 
evidence that windfall gains increase the probability of becoming self-employed. 21 
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Table 13 reports the empirical findings for the sample of men. In Columns (1), (2) and 
(3), one can see that if they are of younger or older age, have young children or are married, 
then windfall gains reduce the probability of being employed. However, when we take away 
the adjustment along the external margin (columns (4) and (5)), the effects largely become not 
statistically significant, except for the effects of having young children. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 13 HERE. ] 
 
Table 14 provides similar findings for women. In Column (1), where the probability of 
being employed is explored, there is a “U" shaped effect of age and a statistically significant 
negative effect of being married. The coefficients on the interactions of children dummies 
with windfall gains are not statistically significant. In the regressions with working hours on 
the left hand side (columns (2) and (3)) the results show that women with young children tend 
to reduce working hours after the receipt of windfall gains. Columns (4) and (5) also confirm 
this finding. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 14 HERE. ] 
 
In order to obtain a better understanding of the heterogeneity in the effects of windfall 
gains and how they depend on personal characteristics, Table 15 reports the predicted effects 
of windfall gains on labour supply by various types of individuals. We compute the effects of 
windfall gains for 8 hypothetical types of individuals. We start by choosing four different age 
groups: 25, 30, 40 or 55 years. We assume that: (i) individuals of age 25 can only be single 
and have no children; (ii) individuals of age 30 are either single with no children, or married 
with one child of age 0-6, (iii) individuals of age 40 can be single without children, married 
without  children,  or  married  with  one  child  of  age  0-6  and  one  child  of  age  7-15;  (iv) 
individuals of age 55 can either be single or married, but they do not have any young children. 
In those specifications where hourly wage is one of the regressors, predicted effects 
are computed at the mean wage in the sample.   Specification (1) represents effects from 
participation regressions, specification (2) reports the FE IV regressions with working hours 22 
 
per week on the left hand side,
19 and specification (3) reports effects from FE IV regressions 
with log working hours as the dependent variable. In brackets we also report p -values from 
the Wald test of whether the computed predicted effects are statistically different from zero. 
For young single people  who  have no children (first row  of Table 15), receiving 
windfall gains reduces the probability of participating in the labour force. This can be seen, 
for example, in column (1), where the coefficient is -0.021. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that after winning an unanticipated windfall young people may decide to prolong 
their education and finance it with the money they have won. However,  as specification (3) 
suggests, conditional on being employed, windfall gains increase the labour supply of young 
people, perhaps inducing young people to become self-employed and work more. 
For individuals of age 30 and with no children, there is a positive effect of windfall 
gains  on the probability of participating in  the labour market  and also  on working hours 
conditional on working. On the other hand, for individuals of the same age who are married 
and have children of young age, the effects of windfall gains on labour supply are negative, 
with effects being strongly negative for both men and women. 
In the case of individuals aged 40 with no spouse and no children, there is a positive 
effect of windfall gains on labour supply. Weekly working hours, on average, increase by 
2.152 hours (specification (2)) or, conditional on working, for 0.028 log hours (specification 
(3)). This piece of evidence can again be related with the rise in probability of becoming self-
employed  as  discussed  in  Lindh  and  Ohlsson  (1996)  and  Taylor  (2001).  Interestingly, 
however, these effects decrease and end up being not statistically significant for individuals of 
age 40 who are married, especially if they have young children. 
We also find support in our data for the behaviour suggested by Lindh and Ohlsson 
(1996) and Taylor (2001). The results are reported in the Appendix (Tables A.1 and A.2). We 
find that winning windfall gains increases the probability of becoming self-employed for men. 
Including interaction terms supports the story that men aged about 40 years have a higher 
probability of becoming self-employed after winning a windfall gain. However, married men 
have a higher probability of becoming self-employed compared to single men. 
Turning back to the results in Table 15, the effects of windfall gains on the labour 
supply of married individuals aged 55 tend to be statistically significant and negative. The 
impact of windfall gains in the employment participation (specification (1)) is equal to -0.028 
                                                 
19 The results of this specification were also checked using the Honore (1992) estimator, without instruments. 
The results were very similar and conclusions would be unchanged. 23 
 
and the effect on weekly working hours (specification (2)) is equal to -0.966. These general 
patterns are similar for men and for women. 
 
[ PLACE TABLE 15 HERE. ] 
 
Summing  up,  several  interesting  results  emerge  when  we  interact  personal 
characteristics with windfall gains.  First, the effects of windfall gains operate both at the 
external and internal margin, but they tend to be stronger at the external margin. This suggests 
that after receiving unanticipated windfall gains, people adjust their labour supply mainly by 
dropping out of the labour force, rather than by reducing their hours worked. Second, there is 
evidence  that  for  some  individuals  (e.g.,  for  single  middle-aged  individuals),  effects  on 
working hours can be positive. And third, for young and old people as well as individuals who 




In this paper, we investigate whether European workers adjust labour supply (that is, 
labour market participation and working hours) in response to windfall gains. According to 
the life-cycle model of labour supply, unanticipated gains in non-earned income are expected 
to have negative effects on labour supply. We use information from the European Household 
Panel for the 1994 to 2001 period to shed some light on the question of interest. 
We  find  weak  evidence  that  individuals  react  to  windfall  gains  by  reducing  their 
working hours. The effects, however, seem to be small. In addition, individuals seem to adjust 
their labour supply mostly along the external margin, by dropping out of the labour force, 
rather than by reducing their working hours while staying in employment. Furthermore, we 
report that the effects on labour supply are stronger in the case of large windfall gains. The 
results and conclusions are robust to different specifications and they are not affected by the 
choice of which measure of wage is used on the right hand side: the hourly wage or the net 
monthly wage. 
Finally, when we allow for heterogeneity of the effects across individuals, the results 
suggest that the impact of windfall gains on labour supply: (i) is more important for young 
and old individuals, (ii) is most negative for married individuals with young children, (iii) but 
can be positive for single individuals aged around 40 years. The last effect can be explained 24 
 
by the effect of windfall gains on reducing liquidity constraints in capital markets and thus 
encouraging people to become self-employed. 
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Table 1: Number of individuals in the sample and number of times they received 
windfall gains during the period in the sample. 
# of times windfall gains received  Frequency  Percent 
0  88,692  88.44 
1  8,824  8.80 
2  1,957  1.95 
3  501  0.50 
4  165  0.16 
5  82  0.08 
6  26  0.03 
7  25  0.02 
8  17  0.02 
Total  100,289  100.00 
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. 
All individuals of age 25-60. Only individuals who are observed for at least 
two periods are included. 
 
Table 2: Number of individuals who ever received small/medium/large windfall gains. 
Size of windfall gains received  Frequency  Percent 
small (2000-10,000 EUR)  4,172  48.81 
medium (10,000-50,000 EUR)  3,353  39.23 
large (more than 50,000 EUR)  1,022  11.96 
Total  8,547  100.00 
Source:  European  Community  Household  Panel  Longitudinal  Users' 
Database. All individuals of age 25-60. Only individuals who are observed 





Table 3: Comparing personal information for winners and non-winners (prior to 
receiving windfall gains). 
  have received 
windfall gains 




  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  p-value 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
household size  3.29  6,674  3.46  75,040  0.000 
number of adults (>16) in household  2.45  6,674  2.63  75,040  0.000 
number of children (16<) in household  0.84  6,674  0.83  75,040  0.739 
age  42.01  6,674  41.23  75,040  0.000 
female dummy  0.51  6,674  0.51  75,040  0.484 
married dummy  0.73  6,664  0.72  74,974  0.249 
secondary education dummy  0.38  6,576  0.36  73,598  0.000 
post secondary education dummy  0.29  6,576  0.18  73,598  0.000 
employed dummy  0.77  6,656  0.70  74,998  0.000 
household income  31,186  6,648  25,863  74,584  0.000 
household income - from working  26,758  6,651  21,337  74,598  0.000 
household income - unearned income  1,448  6,651  848  74,598  0.000 
personal income  15,589  6,674  12,095  75,040  0.000 
personal income - from working  13,270  6,674  10,222  75,040  0.000 
personal income - unearned income  690  6,674  376  75,040  0.000 
personal hourly wage  7.68  6,674  6.78  75,040  0.000 
total hours working per week  30.57  6,497  28.26  73,932  0.000 
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. All individuals of 
age 25-60. Winners are observed one period before receiving windfall gains. This approximately 
corresponds to period 3 in the sample for non-winners. 
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Table 4: Comparison of personal information among winners by the size of windfall 
gains received (prior to receiving windfall gains). 













  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Difference in means  
p-value 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
hh size  3.30  3,098  3.27  2,579  3.24  762  0.358  0.284  0.669 
no. of adults in hh  2.45  3,098  2.43  2,579  2.44  762  0.406  0.721  0.852 
no. of children in hh  0.85  3,098  0.84  2,579  0.80  762  0.662  0.297  0.470 
age  41.40  3,098  42.45  2,579  42.77  762  0.000  0.001  0.428 
female dummy  0.51  3,098  0.52  2,579  0.52  762  0.344  0.555  0.974 
married dummy  0.73  3,095  0.73  2,574  0.71  761  0.683  0.308  0.207 
second. educ. dummy  0.39  3,064  0.37  2,542  0.35  742  0.243  0.029  0.167 
post sec. educ. dummy  0.27  3,064  0.28  2,542  0.37  742  0.341  0.000  0.000 
employed dummy  0.77  3,091  0.76  2,573  0.77  757  0.463  0.811  0.811 
hh income  28,804  3,091  32,185  2,568  36,711  756  0.000  0.000  0.000 
hh income - working  24,958  3,092  27,569  2,570  31,346  756  0.000  0.000  0.000 
hh income - unearned  1,386  3,092  1,181  2,570  2,646  756  0.077  0.000  0.000 
personal income  14,612  3,098  15,987  2,579  18,443  762  0.001  0.000  0.002 
pers. income - working  12,413  3,098  13,656  2,579  15,717  762  0.002  0.000  0.006 
pers. income - unearned  665  3,098  552  2,579  1,280  762  0.086  0.003  0.000 
pers. hourly wage  7.07  3,098  7.98  2,579  8.95  762  0.000  0.000  0.000 
weekly hours working  31.04  3,016  30.01  2,521  31.22  736  0.062  0.834  0.166 
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals of age 25-60 that have at 
some point received windfall gains. Winners are observed one period before receiving windfall gains. Small windfall 
gains (2000-10,000 EUR), medium windfall gains (10,000-50,000 EUR), large windfall gains (more than 50,000 EUR) 
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Table 5: Comparing personal information before and after the receipt of windfall gains. 
  Before  After   
  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs. 
Difference 
in means,  
p-value 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
ALL           
employed dummy  0.77  6,656  0.76  7,079  0.781 
hh income  31,186  6,648  31,823  7,068  0.099 
hh income - working  26,758  6,651  27,312  7,068  0.147 
hh income - unearned  1,448  6,651  1,614  7,068  0.061 
personal income  15,589  6,674  15,986  7,082  0.151 
pers. income - working  13,270  6,674  13,592  7,082  0.228 
pers. income - unearned  690  6,674  762  7,082  0.173 
pers. hourly wage  7.68  6,674  7.81  7.082  0.072 
weekly hours working  30.57  6,497  30.56  6,923  0.966 
SMALL WINDFALL GAIN         
employed dummy  0.77  3,091  0.76  3,444  0.341 
hh income  28,804  3,091  28,874  3,442  0.885 
hh income – working  24,958  3,092  24,928  3,442  0.951 
hh income – unearned  1,386  3,092  1,399  3,442  0.918 
personal income  14,612  3,098  14,690  3,446  0.824 
pers. income - working  12,413  3,098  12,478  3,446  0.847 
pers. income - unearned  665  3,098  678  3,446  0.859 
pers. hourly wage  7.07  3,098  7.28  3,446  0.012 
weekly hours working  31.04  3,016  30.57  3,366  0.362 
MEDIUM WINDFALL GAINS         
employed dummy  0.76  2,573  0.78  2,683  0.261 
hh income  32,185  2,568  33,030  2,675  0.194 
hh income - working  27,569  2,570  28,663  2,675  0.084 
hh income - unearned  1,181  2,570  1,430  2,675  0.035 
personal income  15,987  2,579  16,563  2,684  0.211 
pers. income - working  13,656  2,579  14,238  2,684  0.194 
pers. income - unearned  552  2,579  664  2,684  0.077 
pers. hourly wage  7.98  2,579  8.09  2,684  0.348 
weekly hours working  30.01  2,521  30.58  2,628  0.308 
LARGE WINDFALL GAINS         
employed dummy  0.77  757  0.75  762  0.516 
hh income  36,711  756  40,587  761  0.008 
hh income - working  31,346  756  33,858  761  0.090 
hh income - unearned  2,646  756  3,268  761  0.134 
personal income  18,443  762  20,297  762  0.094 
pers. income - working  15,717  762  16,961  762  0.238 
pers. income - unearned  1,280  762  1,497  762  0.437 
pers. hourly wage  8.95  762  9.07  762  0.691 
weekly hours working  31.22  736  31.10  743  0.912 
Source: European Community Household Panel Longitudinal Users' Database. Individuals of age 
25-60.  Before:  one  period  before  receiving  windfall  gains.  After:  one  period  after  receiving 
windfall gains (not in the period when windfall gains were received). Small windfall gains (2000-








Table 6: Effects of windfall gains on working hours – all. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
windfall gains dummy  -0.00424  -0.0618  0.00194  0.00125  0.00236 
  (0.00360)  (0.159) 
 
(0.161)  (0.00365)  (0.00375) 
hourly wage    -0.831***  -0.441**     
    (0.0262)  (0.203)     
log hourly wage        -0.404***  -0.197*** 
        (0.00610)  (0.0469) 
age  0.0823***  3.876***  3.625***  0.0564***  0.0386*** 
  (0.00272)  (0.121)  (0.150)  (0.00295)  (0.00464) 
age^2  -0.000986***  -0.0452***  -0.0439***  -0.000490***  -0.000391*** 
  (3.09e-05)  (0.00137)  (0.00142)  (3.40e-05)  (3.88e-05) 
married dummy  0.0129*  1.205***  1.157***  0.0146**  0.00932 
  (0.00680)  (0.301)  (0.312)  (0.00671)  (0.00708) 
children 0-6 in household dummy  -0.0516***  -2.841***  -2.961***  -0.0491***  -0.0534*** 
  (0.00571)  (0.253)  (0.259)  (0.00560)  (0.00584) 
children 7-15 in household dummy  -0.0425***  -2.318***  -2.333***  -0.0293***  -0.0292*** 
  (0.00519)  (0.230)  (0.233)  (0.00518)  (0.00533) 
Constant  -0.841***  -41.45***  -36.29***  2.974***  3.131*** 
  (0.0589)  (2.615)  (3.089)  (0.0617)  (0.0680) 
Observations  54164  53011  52348  40239  39789 
Number of individuals  10395  10357  10322  8735  8700 
R-squared  0.024  0.049    0.126   
Hausman test
+      0.000    0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of 
the Hausman test of endogeneity. In IV regression (log) hourly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 






Table 7: Effects of windfall gains on working hours – men. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
windfall gains dummy  -0.00493  -0.158  -0.0525  0.00126  0.00130 
  (0.00443)  (0.237) 
 
(0.239)  (0.00398)  (0.00408) 
hourly wage    -0.879***  -0.812***     
    (0.0360)  (0.218)     
log hourly wage        -0.368***  -0.192*** 
        (0.00704)  (0.0462) 
age  0.0955***  5.188***  5.064***  0.0621***  0.0471*** 
  (0.00338)  (0.181)  (0.205)  (0.00323)  (0.00490) 
age^2  -0.00115***  -0.0602***  -0.0593***  -0.000580***  -0.000495*** 
  (3.83e-05)  (0.00205)  (0.00208)  (3.69e-05)  (4.23e-05) 
married dummy  0.0197**  2.126***  2.050***  0.0349***  0.0293*** 
  (0.00843)  (0.449)  (0.460)  (0.00748)  (0.00785) 
children 0-6 in household dummy  -0.0309***  -1.207***  -1.406***  3.02e-05  -0.00319 
  (0.00684)  (0.366)  (0.372)  (0.00602)  (0.00625) 
children 7-15 in household dummy  -0.0356***  -1.497***  -1.579***  -0.00605  -0.00580 
  (0.00640)  (0.341)  (0.346)  (0.00566)  (0.00582) 
Constant  -0.980***  -59.98***  -56.94***  2.959***  3.076*** 
  (0.0733)  (3.925)  (4.335)  (0.0679)  (0.0738) 
Observations  26176  25626  25327  22503  22278 
Number of individuals  5087  5073  5061  4691  4679 
R-squared  0.044  0.070    0.140   
Hausman test
+      0.000    0.008 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of 
the Hausman test of endogeneity. In IV regression (log) hourly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 





Table 8: Effects of windfall gains on working hours – women. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
windfall gains dummy  -0.00367  0.0201  0.0563  0.000261  0.00366 
  (0.00558)  (0.213)  (0.216) 
 
(0.00659)  (0.00687) 
hourly wage    -0.759***  -0.0268     
    (0.0385)  (0.330)     
log hourly wage        -0.441***  -0.149** 
        (0.0103)  (0.0752) 
age  0.0699***  2.651***  2.259***  0.0474***  0.0230*** 
  (0.00419)  (0.160)  (0.216)  (0.00532)  (0.00763) 
age^2  -0.000832***  -0.0314***  -0.0294***  -0.000357***  -0.000232*** 
  (4.77e-05)  (0.00182)  (0.00195)  (6.21e-05)  (6.81e-05) 
married dummy  0.00581  0.179  0.190  -0.0135  -0.0198 
  (0.0105)  (0.402)  (0.420)  (0.0118)  (0.0125) 
children 0-6 in household dummy  -0.0757***  -4.828***  -4.893***  -0.122***  -0.130*** 
  (0.00915)  (0.350)  (0.362)  (0.0103)  (0.0109) 
children 7-15 in household dummy  -0.0512***  -3.309***  -3.232***  -0.0635***  -0.0643*** 
  (0.00808)  (0.308)  (0.313)  (0.00932)  (0.00974) 
Constant  -0.705***  -23.60***  -16.21***  3.015***  3.245*** 
  (0.0907)  (3.472)  (4.363)  (0.110)  (0.121) 
Observations  27988  27385  27021  17736  17511 
Number of individuals  5308  5284  5261  4044  4021 
R-squared  0.015  0.036    0.128   
Hausman test
+      0.003    0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of 
the  Hausman  test  of  endogeneity.  In  IV  regression  (log)  hourly  wage  is  instrumented  using  two  dummies  for 



















Table 9: Effects of small/medium/large windfall gains on working hours – all. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
small windfall gains dummy  -0.00283  -0.132  -0.114  0.00671  0.00599 
  (0.00458)  (0.203)  (0.204)  (0.00464)  (0.00476) 
medium windfall gains dummy  -0.00597  -0.0102  0.0740  -0.00356  -0.00143 
  (0.00494)  (0.218)  (0.221)  (0.00502)  (0.00517) 
large windfall gains dummy  -0.0213**  -0.568  -0.406  -0.0137  -0.00931 
  (0.00835) 
 
(0.371)  (0.378)  (0.00851)  (0.00882) 
hourly wage    -0.830***  -0.427**     
    (0.0262)  (0.204)     
log hourly wage        -0.404***  -0.200*** 
        (0.00610)  (0.0471) 
age  0.0824***  3.885***  3.630***  0.0565***  0.0388*** 
  (0.00272)  (0.121)  (0.150)  (0.00295)  (0.00464) 
age^2  -0.000985***  -0.0452***  -0.0439***  -0.000488***  -0.000391*** 
  (3.09e-05)  (0.00137)  (0.00142)  (3.40e-05)  (3.88e-05) 
married dummy  0.0131*  1.213***  1.159***  0.0148**  0.00942 
  (0.00680)  (0.301)  (0.312)  (0.00671)  (0.00708) 
children 0-6 in household dummy  -0.0518***  -2.848***  -2.970***  -0.0491***  -0.0534*** 
  (0.00571)  (0.253)  (0.259)  (0.00560)  (0.00584) 
children 7-15 in household dummy  -0.0427***  -2.323***  -2.338***  -0.0294***  -0.0293*** 
  (0.00519)  (0.230)  (0.233)  (0.00518)  (0.00533) 
Constant  -0.848***  -41.78***  -36.56***  2.971***  3.126*** 
  (0.0587)  (2.609)  (3.085)  (0.0616)  (0.0679) 
Observations  54164  53011  52348  40239  39789 
Number of individuals  10395  10357  10322  8735  8700 
R-squared  0.024  0.049    0.127   
Hausman test
+      0.000    0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of 
the  Hausman  test  of  endogeneity.  In  IV  regression  (log)  hourly  wage  is  instrumented  using  two  dummies  for 
















Table 10: Effects of small/medium/large windfall gains on working hours – men. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
small windfall gains dummy  -0.00104  -0.177  -0.126  0.00557  0.00517 
  (0.00563)  (0.301)  (0.303)  (0.00502)  (0.00515) 
medium windfall gains dummy  -0.00617  0.0221  0.111  0.00139  0.00153 
  (0.00610)  (0.326)  (0.329)  (0.00552)  (0.00566) 
large windfall gains dummy  -0.0306***  -1.337**  -0.966*  -0.0208**  -0.0184* 
  (0.0103) 
 
(0.552)  (0.560)  (0.00927)  (0.00953) 
hourly wage    -0.878***  -0.795***     
    (0.0360)  (0.219)     
log hourly wage        -0.368***  -0.196*** 
        (0.00704)  (0.0463) 
age  0.0954***  5.191***  5.065***  0.0620***  0.0473*** 
  (0.00338)  (0.181)  (0.206)  (0.00323)  (0.00490) 
age^2  -0.00115***  -0.0601***  -0.0592***  -0.000577***  -0.000495*** 
  (3.84e-05)  (0.00205)  (0.00209)  (3.69e-05)  (4.23e-05) 
married dummy  0.0199**  2.138***  2.055***  0.0350***  0.0295*** 
  (0.00843)  (0.449)  (0.460)  (0.00748)  (0.00784) 
children 0-6 in household dummy  -0.0311***  -1.221***  -1.418***  -6.81e-05  -0.00316 
  (0.00684)  (0.366)  (0.372)  (0.00602)  (0.00625) 
children 7-15 in household dummy  -0.0357***  -1.505***  -1.586***  -0.00606  -0.00580 
  (0.00640)  (0.341)  (0.346)  (0.00566)  (0.00582) 
Constant  -0.983***  -60.20***  -57.13***  2.960***  3.075*** 
  (0.0730)  (3.914)  (4.333)  (0.0677)  (0.0737) 
Observations  26176  25626  25327  22503  22278 
Number of individuals  5087  5073  5061  4691  4679 
R-squared  0.044  0.070    0.141   
Hausman test
+      0.000    0.034 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of 
the  Hausman  test  of  endogeneity.  In  IV  regression  (log)  hourly  wage  is  instrumented  using  two  dummies  for 

















Table 11: Effects of small/medium/large windfall gains on working hours – women. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
small windfall gains dummy  -0.00442  -0.0920  -0.127  0.00806  0.00690 
  (0.00712)  (0.272)  (0.275)  (0.00845)  (0.00877) 
medium windfall gains dummy  -0.00583  -0.0449  0.0757  -0.0111  -0.00479 
  (0.00765)  (0.291)  (0.297)  (0.00897)  (0.00943) 
large windfall gains dummy  -0.0123  0.211  0.183  -0.00496  0.00332 
  (0.0129) 
 
(0.495)  (0.508)  (0.0154)  (0.0163) 
hourly wage    -0.759***  -0.0251     
    (0.0385)  (0.330)     
log hourly wage        -0.442***  -0.148** 
        (0.0103)  (0.0754) 
age  0.0702***  2.660***  2.270***  0.0476***  0.0231*** 
  (0.00419)  (0.160)  (0.215)  (0.00532)  (0.00763) 
age^2  -0.000833***  -0.0315***  -0.0294***  -0.000357***  -0.000231*** 
  (4.77e-05)  (0.00182)  (0.00195)  (6.21e-05)  (6.81e-05) 
married dummy  0.00593  0.178  0.192  -0.0135  -0.0199 
  (0.0105)  (0.402)  (0.419)  (0.0118)  (0.0126) 
children 0-6 in household dummy  -0.0758***  -4.824***  -4.893***  -0.122***  -0.130*** 
  (0.00915)  (0.350)  (0.363)  (0.0103)  (0.0109) 
children 7-15 in household dummy  -0.0513***  -3.308***  -3.232***  -0.0636***  -0.0643*** 
  (0.00808)  (0.308)  (0.313)  (0.00932)  (0.00974) 
Constant  -0.715***  -23.90***  -16.58***  3.009***  3.237*** 
  (0.0906)  (3.466)  (4.341)  (0.110)  (0.121) 
Observations  27988  27385  27021  17736  17511 
Number of individuals  5308  5284  5261  4044  4021 
R-squared  0.015  0.036    0.129   
Hausman test
+      0.005    0.004 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of 
the Hausman test of endogeneity. In IV regression (log) hourly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 




Table 12: Effects of windfall gains and interactions – all. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
windfall gains dummy  -0.351***  -11.64***  -11.52***  0.0568  -6.97e-05 
  (0.0582) 
 
(2.579)  (2.633)  (0.0631)  (0.0670) 
hourly wage    -0.912***  -0.158     
    (0.0334)  (0.300)     
interaction of windfall gains with 
wage 
  0.117***  -0.187     
  (0.0287)  (0.118)     
log hourly wage        -0.399***  -0.193*** 
        (0.00714)  (0.0475) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
log wage 
      -0.00797  0.00363 
      (0.00617)  (0.0196) 
 
age  0.0700***  3.371***  2.969***  0.0529***  0.0324*** 
  (0.00378)  (0.168)  (0.207)  (0.00410)  (0.00569) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
age 
0.0186***  0.637***  0.726***  -0.000138  0.00192 
(0.00291)  (0.129)  (0.134)  (0.00318)  (0.00339) 
age^2  -0.000843***  -0.0390***  -0.0367***  -0.000440***  -0.000312*** 
  (4.53e-05)  (0.00201)  (0.00209)  (4.97e-05)  (5.52e-05) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
age^2 
-0.000217***  -0.00792***  -0.00869***  -7.41e-06  -3.52e-05 
(3.45e-05)  (0.00153)  (0.00157)  (3.82e-05)  (4.02e-05) 
 
married dummy  0.0398***  2.082***  2.115***  0.0268***  0.0221*** 
  (0.00790)  (0.350)  (0.361)  (0.00781)  (0.00824) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
married dummy 
-0.0436***  -1.505***  -1.619***  -0.0233***  -0.0244*** 
(0.00694)  (0.308)  (0.316)  (0.00702)  (0.00724) 
 
children 0-6 in hhold dummy  -0.0425***  -1.978***  -2.251***  -0.0332***  -0.0371*** 
  (0.00740)  (0.328)  (0.336)  (0.00732)  (0.00760) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 0-6 dummy 
-0.00801  -1.223***  -0.947***  -0.0247***  -0.0247*** 
(0.00783)  (0.347)  (0.358)  (0.00783)  (0.00827) 
children 7-15 in hhold dummy  -0.0433***  -2.135***  -2.149***  -0.0303***  -0.0312*** 
  (0.00676)  (0.299)  (0.304)  (0.00679)  (0.00699) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 7-15 dummy 
0.00822  0.0116  0.0738  0.00755  0.00931 
(0.00755)  (0.334)  (0.339)  (0.00756)  (0.00778) 
 
Constant  -0.610***  -32.06***  -25.22***  3.009***  3.222*** 
  (0.0765)  (3.395)  (3.928)  (0.0807)  (0.0897) 
Observations  54164  53011  52348  40239  39789 
Number of individuals  10395  10357  10322  8735  8700 
R-squared  0.026  0.051    0.128   
Hausman test
+      0.001    0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of the 
Hausman test of endogeneity. In IV regression (log) hourly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 





Table 13: Effects of windfall gains and interactions – men. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
windfall gains dummy  -0.292***  -12.85***  -12.35***  -0.00101  -0.0175 
  (0.0719)  (3.857) 
 
(3.929)  (0.0688)  (0.0718) 
hourly wage    -0.933***  -0.510     
    (0.0446)  (0.334)     
interaction of windfall gains with 
wage 
  0.0820**  -0.212     
    (0.0393)  (0.144)     
log hourly wage        -0.366***  -0.185*** 
        (0.00810)  (0.0465) 
interaction of windfall gains with log 
wage 
      -0.00325  -0.0191 
      (0.00685)  (0.0201) 
 
Age  0.0862***  4.614***  4.361***  0.0560***  0.0388*** 
  (0.00470)  (0.252)  (0.288)  (0.00448)  (0.00612) 
interaction of windfall gains with age  0.0154***  0.687***  0.750***  0.00231  0.00469 
  (0.00360)  (0.193)  (0.200)  (0.00347)  (0.00373) 
age^2  -0.00104***  -0.0531***  -0.0516***  -0.000498***  -0.000386*** 
  (5.60e-05)  (0.00300)  (0.00307)  (5.39e-05)  (6.03e-05) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
age^2 
-0.000180***  -0.00862***  -0.00898***  -3.98e-05  -6.76e-05 
(4.26e-05)  (0.00228)  (0.00233)  (4.14e-05)  (4.38e-05) 
 
married dummy  0.0353***  2.579***  2.514***  0.0387***  0.0344*** 
  (0.00992)  (0.529)  (0.542)  (0.00884)  (0.00924) 
 
interaction of windfall gains with 
married dummy 
-0.0251***  -0.735  -0.758  -0.00908  -0.0100 
(0.00904)  (0.485)  (0.494)  (0.00824)  (0.00850) 
children 0-6 in hhold dummy  -0.0152*  -0.328  -0.726  0.0130*  0.00975 
  (0.00897)  (0.479)  (0.488)  (0.00790)  (0.00817) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 0-6 dummy 
-0.0214**  -1.235**  -0.893*  -0.0224***  -0.0210** 
(0.00955)  (0.510)  (0.519)  (0.00845)  (0.00881) 
children 7-15 in hhold dummy  -0.0321***  -1.285***  -1.408***  0.00313  0.00272 
  (0.00839)  (0.448)  (0.455)  (0.00749)  (0.00770) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 7-15 dummy 
-0.000463  -0.112  0.0145  -0.0125  -0.0105 
(0.00939)  (0.502)  (0.507)  (0.00834)  (0.00855) 
 
Constant  -0.807***  -49.14***  -44.71***  3.053***  3.198*** 
  (0.0951)  (5.093)  (5.583)  (0.0887)  (0.0976) 
Observations  26176  25626  25327  22503  22278 
Number of individuals  5087  5073  5061  4691  4679 
R-squared  0.045  0.072    0.141   
Hausman test
+      0.001    0.048 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of the 
Hausman test of endogeneity. In IV regression (log) hourly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 





Table 14: Effects of windfall gains and interactions – women. 
Dependent variable:  Employment 
dummy  Working hours per week  Log working hours per week 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  FE  FE  FE IV  FE  FE IV 
windfall gains dummy  -0.387***  -7.540**  -8.464**  0.213*  0.0951 
  (0.0909)  (3.465) 
 
(3.528)  (0.115)  (0.125) 
hourly wage    -0.919***  -0.224     
    (0.0512)  (0.425)     
interaction of windfall gains with 
wage 
  0.210***  0.115     
    (0.0442)  (0.177)     
log hourly wage        -0.438***  -0.170** 
        (0.0124)  (0.0786) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
log wage 
      -0.00632  0.0393 
      (0.0113)  (0.0383) 
 
age  0.0558***  2.361***  1.944***  0.0511***  0.0246*** 
  (0.00586)  (0.224)  (0.283)  (0.00741)  (0.00950) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
age 
0.0204***  0.401**  0.482***  -0.00848  -0.00642 
  (0.00453)  (0.173)  (0.182)  (0.00581)  (0.00626) 
age^2  -0.000670***  -0.0278***  -0.0251***  -0.000394***  -0.000246** 
  (7.03e-05)  (0.00268)  (0.00284)  (9.10e-05)  (9.82e-05) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
age^2 
-0.000236***  -0.00500**  -0.00596***  9.49e-05  6.62e-05 
(5.41e-05)  (0.00206)  (0.00214)  (7.04e-05)  (7.51e-05) 
 
married dummy  0.0403***  1.212***  1.279***  0.00334  -0.00508 
  (0.0121)  (0.464)  (0.482)  (0.0135)  (0.0145) 
 
interaction of windfall gains with 
married dummy 
-0.0549***  -1.788***  -1.803***  -0.0315***  -0.0288** 
(0.0103)  (0.396)  (0.414)  (0.0117)  (0.0125) 
children 0-6 in hhold dummy  -0.0739***  -4.075***  -4.127***  -0.100***  -0.107*** 
  (0.0117)  (0.448)  (0.460)  (0.0134)  (0.0141) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 0-6 dummy 
0.00775  -1.070**  -1.017**  -0.0330**  -0.0340** 
(0.0124)  (0.475)  (0.492)  (0.0144)  (0.0154) 
children 7-15 in hhold dummy  -0.0564***  -3.356***  -3.230***  -0.0778***  -0.0807*** 
  (0.0105)  (0.400)  (0.406)  (0.0121)  (0.0127) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 7-15 dummy 
0.0176  0.406  0.353  0.0333**  0.0353** 
(0.0117)  (0.447)  (0.454)  (0.0135)  (0.0141) 
 
Constant  -0.440***  -18.02***  -10.49**  2.912***  3.231*** 
  (0.118)  (4.520)  (5.328)  (0.145)  (0.159) 
Observations  27988  27385  27021  17736  17511 
Number of individuals  5308  5284  5261  4044  4021 
R-squared  0.017  0.039    0.130   
Hausman test
+      0.007    0.007 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
+ Reports p-value of the 
Hausman test of endogeneity. In IV regression (log) hourly wage is instrumented using two dummies for education, 









Table 15: Effects of windfall gains on labour supply by types of individuals. 
 
  Full sample  Men  Women 





-0.021**  -0.259  0.033***  -0.020*  -1.002  0.019  -0.025  0.682  0.049** 





0.012*  0.979***  0.033***  0.007  0.279  0.024**  0.012  1.455***  0.035** 





-0.039***  -1.587***  -0.016**  -0.040***  -1.372***  -0.007  -0.035***  -1.365***  -0.028* 





0.046***  2.152***  0.028***  0.034***  1.494***  0.023***  0.050***  2.107***  0.017 





0.003  0.533*  0.003  0.009  0.736  0.013*  -0.005  0.305  -0.011 






0.003  -0.340  -0.012  -0.013  -0.143  -0.018*  0.021  -0.358  -0.010 





0.016*  0.652  0.006  0.008  -0.051  -0.002  0.020  0.853  0.015 





-0.028***  -0.966***  -0.018**  -0.017**  -0.809*  -0.013  -0.035***  -0.950**  -0.013 
(0.000)  (0.002)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.093)  (0.167)  (0.001)  (0.020)  (0.384) 
p-values  in parentheses; testing  the  null  whether linear combination of coefficients equal to zero. * significant at 10%;  ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) Employment dummy as dependent variable, FE; (2) Working hours per week as 
dependent variable, FE IV; (3) Log working hours per week as dependent variable, FE IV. In (2) and (3) wages are also included 
in the regression; in these cases effects are calculated at the value of the average wage in the sample (all, men or women).   41 
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-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
time (time of windfall = 0)
household non-work income personal non-work income
 
Source:  European  Community  Household  Panel  Longitudinal  Users'  Database.  Individuals  who  received 
windfall gains of age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received. 
 42 
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time (time of windfall = 0)
received small windfall received medium or large windfall
 
Source:  European  Community  Household  Panel  Longitudinal  Users'  Database.  Individuals  who  received 
windfall gains of age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received. Small windfall gains 
(2000-10,000 EUR), medium windfall gains (10,000-50,000 EUR), large windfall gains (more than 50,000 EUR) 
 43 
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time (time of windfall = 0)
 
Source:  European  Community  Household  Panel  Longitudinal  Users'  Database.  Individuals  who  received 
windfall gains of age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received. 
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time (time of windfall = 0)
received small windfall received medium or large windfall
 
Source:  European  Community  Household  Panel  Longitudinal  Users'  Database.  Individuals  who  received 
windfall gains of age 25-60. Time period 0 is period when windfall gains were received. Small windfall gains 




















Table A.1: Effects of windfall gains on probability of becoming self-employed. 
Dependent variable: Self-employed dummy 
  all  men  women  all  men  women 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
windfall gains dummy  0.00807***  0.0122***  0.00399       
  (0.00231) 
 
(0.00358)  (0.00297)       
small windfall gains 
dummy 
      0.00198  0.00599  -0.00195 
      (0.00294)  (0.00454)  (0.00378) 
medium windfall gains 
dummy 
      0.00900***  0.0147***  0.00345 
      (0.00317)  (0.00492)  (0.00406) 
large windfall gains 
dummy 
      0.0144***  0.0175**  0.0120* 
 
 
    (0.00535)  (0.00832)  (0.00685) 
Age  0.0208***  0.0312***  0.0114***  0.0212***  0.0316***  0.0117*** 
  (0.00175)  (0.00272)  (0.00222)  (0.00174)  (0.00272)  (0.00222) 
age^2  -0.000243***  -0.000359***  -0.000139***  -0.000245***  -0.000361***  -0.000140*** 
  (1.99e-05)  (3.09e-05)  (2.53e-05)  (1.99e-05)  (3.09e-05)  (2.53e-05) 
married dummy  0.0219***  0.0335***  0.00945*  0.0219***  0.0334***  0.00944* 
  (0.00437)  (0.00680)  (0.00560)  (0.00437)  (0.00680)  (0.00560) 
children 0-6 in household 
dummy 
-0.000748  -0.00464  0.00135  -0.000758  -0.00475  0.00147 
(0.00367)  (0.00552)  (0.00486)  (0.00367)  (0.00552)  (0.00487) 
children 7-15 in household 
dummy 
-0.00284  -0.00471  -0.00221  -0.00280  -0.00469  -0.00214 
(0.00333)  (0.00516)  (0.00429)  (0.00333)  (0.00516)  (0.00429) 
Constant  -0.316***  -0.490***  -0.156***  -0.328***  -0.502***  -0.169*** 
  (0.0378)  (0.0591)  (0.0482)  (0.0377)  (0.0589)  (0.0481) 
Observations  54210  26177  28033  54210  26177  28033 
Number of individuals  10397  5088  5309  10397  5088  5309 
R-squared  0.005  0.011  0.002  0.006  0.011  0.002 




























Table A.2: Effects of windfall gains on probability of becoming self-employed (with 
interactions). 
Dependent variable: Self-employed dummy 
  all  men  women 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
windfall dummy  -0.0731*  -0.0709  -0.0698 
  (0.0374) 
 
(0.0580)  (0.0483) 
age  0.0159***  0.0283***  0.00510 
  (0.00243)  (0.00379)  (0.00311) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
age 
0.00465**  0.00449  0.00435* 
(0.00187)  (0.00290)  (0.00241) 
age^2  -0.000182***  -0.000322***  -6.07e-05 
  (2.91e-05)  (4.52e-05)  (3.73e-05) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
age^2 
-6.13e-05***  -5.84e-05*  -5.82e-05** 
(2.22e-05) 
 
(3.44e-05)  (2.87e-05) 
married dummy  0.0201***  0.0257***  0.0114* 
  (0.00508)  (0.00801)  (0.00645) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
married dummy 
0.00361  0.0139*  -0.00218 
  (0.00447) 
 
(0.00730)  (0.00549) 
children 0-6 in hhold dummy  0.00358  0.00496  0.000725 
  (0.00476)  (0.00724)  (0.00625) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 0-6 dummy 
-0.00653  -0.0161**  0.00311 
(0.00503)  (0.00770)  (0.00661) 
children 7-15 in hhold dummy  0.00251  0.00485  -0.00122 
  (0.00435)  (0.00678)  (0.00558) 
interaction of windfall gains with 
children 7-15 dummy 
-0.00808*  -0.0149**  -0.000610 
(0.00486) 
 
(0.00758)  (0.00625) 
Constant  -0.225***  -0.436***  -0.0395 
  (0.0492)  (0.0768)  (0.0629) 
Observations  54210  26177  28033 
Number of individuals  10397  5088  5309 
R-squared  0.006  0.011  0.002 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All regressions include individual fixed effects. 
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